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Abstract
We analyse the impact of the housing tenure on labour market outcomes
using individual data from the UK Labour Force Survey. In dening the resi-
dential status, we distinguish between outright owners and mortgage-holders,
and between social and private renters. We estimate both a binary model
for the probability to be unemployed and a hazard model for exits out of un-
employment. In both models we test for endogenity of housing tenure. In
the binary model, exogeneity is rejected so we perform endogenous multino-
mial treatment eects estimates. In the hazard model we nd no evidence of
unobserved heterogeneity thus estimates are performed assuming exogeneity.
Results show that mortgagers have the lowest probability to be unemployed
and the highest job nding rates, while social renters exhibit the worst per-
formance. Whether private renters perform better than outright owners is
a matter of debate: while we have no evidence in favour of this claim, the
evidence in favour of the opposite is only modest.
JEL Classication: J61, J64, R2.
Keywords: Housing Tenure, Oswald Eect, Endogenous Multinomial Treatment
Eect, Unemployment Duration.
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1 Introduction
The empirical literature which has investigated the relationship between
homeownership and labour market outcomes has plenty of ndings at odds
with the so-called \Oswald thesis", which would suggest worse employment
prospectus for homeowners than renters (Oswald [1996], Oswald [1997], Oswald
[1999]). The idea is that residential mobility constraints imposed by home-
ownership hamper the propensity to move for job reasons. The consequences
should be less intense job search and lower job nding rates.
This claim has been further rened allowing for more precise denitions
of the residential status. In fact, owners who have to comply with mortgage
payments have higher nancial constraints than outright owners, that can
counteract reduced mobility due to ownership. A similar distinction may
hold for private and social renters as the latter should experience lock-in
eects similar to those which hamper owners mobility. Below-market rent,
long waiting lists, security of tenure and the restricted transferability within
social housing may harm relative employment performance of social renters.
In this vein, the Oswald thesis can be tested simply comparing outright
owners and private renters, as representative of the typical homeowners and
renters who one should have in mind for the main mechanism underlying the
Oswald thesis to emerge.
With micro data, the Oswald hypothesis has been tested mainly looking
at two dierent dimensions of labour market performance: the probability to
be unemployed and, more often, the unemployment duration1. The typical
approach consists in modeling such outcomes as a function of the residential
status, either being a binary variable for homeownership or a multinomial
variable which splits both owners and renters in more categories (owners
outright or with mortgage, social and private renters, and sometimes also
free-renters).
As regards the rst dimension, the typical nding is that homeownership
reduces the probability to be unemployed, both when it is assumed exoge-
nous (Coulson and Fisher [2002], Arulampalam et al. [2000]2) and when it is
allowed to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity (Flatau et al. [2003]
and Coulson and Fisher [2009]). Flatau et al. [2003] use also a rened deni-
tion of residential status and conclude that owners with mortgage are far less
likely to be unemployed than owners outright, that the latter are even less
1For an excellent survey of all various tests of the Oswald hypothesis see
Havet and Penot [2010].
2Arulampalam et al. [2000] take individual heterogeneity into account estimating a
random eects probit on a sample of British male drawn from the BHPS for the period
1991-1995.
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likely than private renters, and that social and free renters have the highest
probability instead. Anyway, results of Flatau et al. [2003] can be criticized
since they use only age dummies an education dummies as instruments for
the residential status, which are likely to be correlated with unemployment
outcomes as well. Moreover the statistical method is questionable, as for
the two-step approach to produce consistent estimates, one should apply a
(complicated) correction which apparently has not been carried out3.
Empirical investigations of the eect of residential status on the unem-
ployment duration are more controversial. This may be a consequence of
the dierent empirical strategies employed. Most reliable studies have esti-
mated this eect explicitly accounting for endogeneity. There are two basic
approaches to deal with it. The traditional approach consists in performing
two step procedures in which identication is achieved through exclusion re-
strictions. In the rst step, residential status, either binary or multinomial,
is modeled as a function of regressors used in the second step and instru-
ments which aect housing tenure choice but are hopefully not important in
explaining unemployment duration once the eect of regressors is partialled
out (Green and Hendershott [2001], Flatau et al. [2003], Brunet and Lesueur
[2009], Brunet et al. [2007]).
More recent contributions use a simultaneous estimation method in which
multiple spells data are exploited to identify the residential status eect
(Munch et al. [2006], Battu et al. [2008], Van Vuuren [2009])4. The theoret-
ical fundament of these studies is the local versus non-local labour market
argument outlined by Munch et al. [2006]. Unemployment spells are distin-
guished between those who end up in jobs in the local and in jobs in the
non-local labour market, where the dierence is simply that the latter re-
quire a residential move. Then, competing-risk hazard models are jointly
estimated with a tenure choice equation to compare the eect of residential
status on exits to local jobs and to non-local jobs. While homeownership
is expected to hamper exits to jobs which require a move, the underlying
theory would suggest a positive eect on hazard to local jobs.
Typically, as for the probability to be unemployed, homeowners have
higher hazard rates into employment than renters (Goss and Phillips [1997],
Coulson and Fisher [2002], Flatau et al. [2003]5, Munch et al. [2006], Van Vuuren
3See Wooldridge [2010], chapter 15, for a textbook discussion and Rivers and Vuong
[1988] for the correct method to perform the two-stage.
4This approach requires data such that a sucient number of individuals experience
unemployment spells in a dierent residential status.
5Flatau et al. [2003] obtain a signicant eect for males, but not for females. These
results are based on the assumption of exogenous homeownership since in a rst analysis
exogeneity of homeownership cannot be not rejected. Exogeneity of housing tenure is not
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[2009]), but this is not always the case. For example, Brunet and Lesueur
[2009] with French data and Green and Hendershott [2001] with US data,
adopting a dierent estimation method both nd that homeownership length-
ens the unemployment duration, i.e a result in favour of the Oswald hy-
pothesis. In the analysis of Munch et al. [2006] and Van Vuuren [2009] the
counter-Oswald eect is anyway driven by a larger eect for exits to local
jobs: homeownership hampers exits to non-local jobs but favours exits to
local jobs, and the latter eect outweights the former6.
When more rened denitions of residential status are used, the most
robust nding is that mortgagers have the highest probability to escape un-
employment. The comparison between outright owners and private renters
is ambiguous. Flatau et al. [2003] on US data and Battu et al. [2008] on UK
data nd no signicant dierences7. Brunet et al. [2007] conrm results of
Battu et al. [2008] on UK data, but for French data they nd that outright
owners reenter employment more slowly than private renters. Social rent-
ing instead seems to lengthen unemployment duration relative to private, as
found by Flatau et al. [2003], Battu et al. [2008] and Brunet et al. [2007] for
the UK. For France, in Brunet et al. [2007] the eect is positive too but not
signicant.
Our goal in this study is to take simultaneously into account two impor-
tant issues, in order to assess the empirical eect of housing tenure on both
labour market outcomes: the potential endogeneity of residential status, and
the renement in its denition distinguishing in particular between owners
with mortgage and outright, and between social and private renters. We
carry out the analysis on UK data drawn from the Labour Force Study. This
is not the rst application on UK data, but the LFS had never been used
before for this purpose.
A typical econometric problem which arises in this literature when allow-
ing for endogeneity is that the standard two-stage least squares estimator
is strictly only applicable to situations with linear and continuous outcome
and endogenous regressors, both of which are not appropriate when study-
ing the eect of housing tenure on labour market outcomes, such as unem-
ployment status or unemployment duration. As for binary models, we opt
for simultaneous estimation methods, which allow eciency gains in esti-
rejected when the use a 5-fold classication of residential status either.
6Munch et al. [2006] use data for Denmark and Van Vuuren [2009] for the Netherlands.
In the latter both eects are smaller and the negative eect on non-local jobs is even not
signicant.
7Flatau et al. [2003] cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of housing tenure after
a formal test, so their results are based on that assumption. Battu et al. [2008] nd no
signicant dierences both for exits to local and non-local jobs.
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mation and account for unobserved heterogeneity which can correlate with
housing tenure. In particular, we make use of an endogenous multinomial
treatment eects method developed by Deb and Trivedi (Deb and Trivedi
[2006a], Deb and Trivedi [2006b]). As for the unemployment duration, we
refer to a discrete time proportional hazard model with normal distributed
unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate two main hazard models with exits
to employment and to inactivity. Since the hypothesis of absence of un-
observed heterogeneity cannot be rejected in both models, we do not even
need to control explicitly for potential sources of correlation between housing
tenure and the error term, which otherwise would be very complex in this
framework.
The paper is organized in four main sections. The second and the third
discuss respectively the data and sample used, and the methodology. Each
section looks separately at the probability to be unemployed and the unem-
ployment duration. The fourth and the fth discuss results for the former
an for the latter respectively. The last section concludes.
2 Data and Preliminary Evidence
We use a data set drawn from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly
national-wide survey which collects address-based interviews of about 60,000
households for each quarter. Each individual is interviewed in ve consecutive
quarters on a rotating panel basis. The sample we use spans the period Spring
1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005 so that we have
28 quarters of observations8.
For both analysis of labour market outcomes we select a sub-sample of
respondent male head of households in working age (aged 16-64). Moreover
we drop a small number of observations for people who have never had paid
job, or get retirement or old age pension, or are in full-time education or
occupy the household rent-free9.
The reason why we prefer to focus only on head of households is that in
order to model an individual tenure choice, we need individuals for whom the
residential status is actually the outcome of an individual choice, which is
8In accordance with EU regulations, the LFS moved from seasonal (Spring, Sum-
mer, Autumn, Winter) quarters to calendar quarters (January-March, April-June, July-
September, October-December) in 2006. We use the old seasonal quarters les to avoid
major problems which may arise with the calendar ones before 2006 due to discontinuities
in some relevant variables.
9Given the subjective nature of questions relating unemployment status or duration we
prefer to drop proxy responses and whenever possible we use LFS sampling weights which
are designed to allow also for non-response.
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typically the case for people responsible for the accommodation in the sense
that either the accommodation is owned in their name or they pay the hous-
ing costs10. For some not head of households it may be misleading to seek for
a causal link from housing tenure to labour market behaviour given that the
former may not reect the outcome of an individual choice11. For example,
a young still living in the family home and dependent on their parents in an
owner-occupied accommodation can hardly have a labour market behaviour
assimilable to the typical homeowner. Of course this may be the case also
for young adults (even older than 24) living in the family home even though
they are no more notionally dependent on the parents and they are supposed
to make an independent tenure choice. In the latter case, we may keep them
in the sample and assume they live in a rent-free status (Flatau et al. [2003],
Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), but we believe it is somewhat dicult to single
out a rule to identify correctly free-renters since the choice would be highly
arbitrary. More in general, it is also questionable to include other kinds of not
head of households treating their residential status as that of the household,
at least so long as we model housing tenure as an individual choice.
2.1 Labour Market Status
According to the ILO denitions, we dene three labour market statuses:
employed, unemployed, inactive. Employed are workers with paid job; un-
employed are without paid job but both they have been looking for it in the
last four weeks and they are available to start a new job within the follow-
ing two weeks; inactive are people in working age who do not stick to the
unemployment denition.
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics on the labour market status
distribution by housing tenure. The most striking evidence are the high
employment rates of mortgagers (92:8%) and private renters (81%), especially
if compared to the low rates of outright owners (64:5%) and social renters
(48:4%). However, it is clear that the low numbers of the latter are driven
by a very high propensity to be out of the labour force, being 32:7% for
outright owners and 39:2% for social renters. This means that if we look
10This is the LFS denition of household: \A household is dened as a single person, or
a group of people living at the same address who have the address as their only or main
residence and either share one main meal a day or share the living accommodation (or
both)". The LFS uses this denition of head of household: \Head of household (HOH) is
dened as either the man or the husband/male partner of the woman in whose name the
accommodation was owned or rented. Where two people have equal claim the either the
oldest male is selected or, in all female households, the oldest female".
11Nor may be an individual choice the residential status of some head of households, but
this issue can be handled using controls at the household level in the empirical analysis.
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at notional unemployment rates, intended as the percentage of unemployed
in the labour force, the relative performance can change signicantly. In
fact, outright owners have an unemployment rate of 4:2%, which is nearly a
half of private renters rate (8:3%), while mortgagers (1:9%) and social renters
(20:4%) are at the opposite extremes. It is thus striking that 14:2% of renters
are unemployed, against only 2:3% of homeowners.
For binary labour market status models, we are interested, along the
line of the related literature, in examining how the housing tenure aects
the probability of being unemployed. As we can easily understand from the
Tables discussed above, the outcomes of this kind of analysis depend crucially
on what denition of unemployed we choose or/and on what sub-sample we
condition on to make comparisons. For example, so long as we are interested
in studying the chances of a particular worker to have a job given that he
is in the labour force, it is appropriate to run a binary model (unemployed
versus employed) on a restricted sub-sample without inactive people.
Anyway this strategy clearly involves a sample selection issue since the
rule by which workers choose to be out of the labour force may be not random,
but may depend on individual characteristics such as housing tenure, as it
seems very likely according to our sample statistics. In fact both outright
owners and social renters do have higher propensity to be inactive. The
key point here is that some people are out of the labour force since they do
not want to work, but some other drop o the labour force because a weak
labour market position discourages them to look for work though they would
be willing to have a job. If outright owners and social renters are more likely
to be inactive for the latter reason, the procedure outlined above would yield
biased estimates, since if they were in the labour force they would lower the
employment probability of their category.
For this reason it is important to make a distinction within inactive be-
tween workers who would like to have a paid job but do not stick to the ILO
unemployment denition, and ex-workers who do not search since basically
they do not want to work. The former may be notionally non ILO unem-
ployed since either they are searching for work but are not available to start
a job at once, or they are not currently seeking for it since, for example,
they are discouraged, temporarily sick or disabled, waiting for results of an
application, or just stopped, say, ve weeks ago.
The LFS allows us to make this distinction and to look thoroughly into
the reason why people do not want to work. Tables 3 and 4 give insights
on this point splitting inactive people on the basis of the response to this
specic survey question: \Even though you were not looking for work in the
4 weeks ending Sunday the [date], would you like to have a regular paid job
at the moment, either a full or part-time job?". Results show clearly that
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the percentage of inactive who respond to be not interested in paid job is
remarkably higher for homeowners (76:5%), especially for outright owners
(82:7%). Tables 5 and 6 focus on the main reason why inactive respond to
be not interested in paid job. In general, the most important reasons are
long-term sickness/disability and retirement from paid work. However, it is
interesting to notice that while renters attribute a far larger importance to
the rst reason, the reverse is true for outright owners. Moreover, 7:1% of
outright owners say they do not need a job while the percentage is negligible
for renters.
To summarize, we think the most proper strategy to identify the eect of
housing tenure on the employment probability is to compare employed versus
non-employed conditioning on workers who would like a paid job. Thus
as a test of the Oswald hypothesis, we include in the sample also inactive
workers willing to work and pool them with unemployed in dening the
binary variable.
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of labour market status by housing
tenure, where we distinguish inactive people according to the question above,
yielding a 4-fold categorization for the status. The bar graphs show that the
statuses distribution varies remarkably and that we cannot identify even one
status with a roughly constant percentage over housing tenure. Mortgagers
distinguish themselves for the highest employed percentage, social renters for
the highest percentages of unemployed and of inactive who want a paid job,
outright owners for the highest percentage of inactive who do not want job.
The distribution of private renters is somehow similar to that of mortgagers
given a very high employed percentage and small portions of the other sta-
tuses. Moreover, these Figures corroborate the view that the collapse of the
four residential statuses to yield the classical dichotomy homeowners-renters
would be misleading since many features of the housing tenure story would
be lost.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of labour market status focusing on
the sample we shall use in the analysis, i.e. without those unwilling to work.
Social renters are by far the least likely to be employed, while mortgagers
are the most likely. Employment rates are very similar for outright owners
and private renters but it is evident that the former tend to stay more out
of the labour force than the latter when without a job. Thus, if we did
not include inactive willing to work, employment rates of outright owners
would be remarkably higher relatively to private renters. The econometric
analysis will yield more rened results on this comparison by controlling for
observable and unobservable characteristics.
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2.2 Unemployment Duration
In order to perform an unemployment duration analysis by means of the LFS,
we exploit a survey variable which heavily relies on the information provided
by the respondent. This variable reports the minimum of the length of the
time the respondent states to have been looking for work and the length
of time since his last job12. Durations are grouped in 8 time intervals: 0-3
months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, 3-4 years, 4-5 years, 5
years or more. We use as measure of the spell length the value reported in the
last interview associated with the unemployed status before a switch. The
status in which the spell ends up may be either employment or inactivity, or
may be unemployment when the interview is the last, that is the spell is right
censored. Regressors are assumed spell constant and their values refer to the
last interview before the exit (or the last interview for censored spells)13.
Apart from the discrete nature of this variable, the choice to refer to the
last interview as unemployed leads to an underestimation of the spell since
the precise day in which the spell ends can be whatever else up to the day
of the next interview. Yet, this underestimation is of minor concern for our
analysis since the error derives from an asynchrony between the spell window
and the interviews intervals, which is likely to be random14.
To prevent interferences in the causal link from housing tenure to un-
employment duration we focus on a sub-sample with stable housing tenure
data over the spell. In particular, we drop spells for individuals who switch
housing tenure in the quarter either immediately preceding or following that
in which the spells ends. The rst correction rules out situations such when
long unemployment spells end right after the entrance in a residential status
which favours the exit (either into employment or inactivity). The second
one rules out also situations when the change in housing tenure takes place
right after the end of the spell. However this sample restriction is of minor
importance since the decrease in the sample size is negligible. Before the
restriction, we have 9; 353 spells of which 3; 023 end in employment, 1; 326
end in inactivity and 5; 000 are right censored. After the restriction we have
9; 230 spells of which 2; 973 end in employment, 1; 297 end in inactivity and
12This is the LFS durun variable.
13In the sample there are some individuals with multiple unemployment spells, but since
they are too few to be exploited we treat multiple spells as spells of dierent individuals.
14There may be a second method to generate unemployment spells from the LFS, which
consists of adding up 3 months for each consecutive quarter in which the individual is
unemployed (Stam and Long [2010]). This method would be more precise in that the
status would be checked quarter by quarter instead of relying on the memory of the
interviewed, but it would have the drawback of ignoring short spells occurring in between
two consecutive quarters.
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4; 960 are right censored.
We analyse separately spells ending up into employment and into inactiv-
ity. First we produce some basic evidence for both spells analysis. Figures 5
and 6 report the Kaplan-Meyer estimates of the cumulative density function
for exits to employment. Figures 7 and 8 report the Kaplan-Meyer estimates
for exits to inactivity. A rst evaluation of the hazards without controlling
for observable or unobservable characteristics suggests that the cumulative
probabilities both of nding a job and of stopping to look for work are always
higher for mortgagers and outright owners than for social and private renters.
In particular, exits into employment are always more likely for mortgagers
than outright owners, while similar for private and social renters. Exits into
inactivity are always more likely for outright owners than for mortgagers,
while similar for private and social renters.
3 Methodology
3.1 Labour Market Status
For the purpose of estimating the eect of housing tenure on the probabil-
ity of having a job, we model a binary outcome equation which compares
non-employed against employed. Notional ILO unemployed are pooled with
workers no more in the labour force but who would like a paid job.
When trying to estimate the causal eect of housing tenure on the prob-
ability to be non-employed, one should keep in mind that housing tenure
may be endogenous. In fact some unobserved factors which aect the labour
market outcomes are likely to be correlated with housing tenure. In that
case it is important to isolate the true impact of housing tenure from that of
unobserved factors which are correlated with it.
In binary outcome models endogeneity could be addressed applying non
standard two stage approaches, such as those introduced in Rivers and Vuong
[1988]. They consist in a rst stage equation, which models the housing
tenure discrete choice as a function of the exogenous variables and some
suitable instruments, and in a second stage equation, by which the binary
outcome is modeled as a probit using the exogenous variables and the pre-
dicted errors from the rst stage as regressors. The Rivers-Vuong approach
also turns out to be a very useful and simple tool to test for endogeneity,
since the t-statistic of the predicted error terms in the second stage represents
a valid test for the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
In the empirical literature, some studies have attempted to allow for this
source of bias adopting a very similar method (see Flatau et al. [2003] and
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Coulson and Fisher [2009]). Unfortunately this two stage approach is typi-
cally less ecient than simultaneous estimation methods and requires com-
plicated calculations to get second step consistent average partial eects and
standard errors, which is mostly true when the endogenous regressor is dis-
crete (see Wooldridge [2010], section 15.7). For these reasons we prefer to
adopt a joint estimation method of the two sets of equations, though the
Rivers-Vuong two-step approach will be employed to test for endogeneity.
In particular, we make use of an endogenous multinomial treatment eect
estimation method developed by Deb and Trivedi (Deb and Trivedi [2006a],
Deb and Trivedi [2006b]) which turns out to be the most suitable method we
are aware of for our case15. This method can be used to analyze the eects
of an endogenous multinomial treatment on a binary outcome variable. In
our framework the treatments are represented by the four housing tenure
statuses. More precisely, we set private renting as the control group (i.e.
base category) and we interpret property owned outright, mortgage holding
and social renting as three dierent kinds of treatment whose dierential
eect on the probability of being non-employed we aim at estimating.
The model specication comprises an outcome equation with a structural-
causal interpretation and other equations that model the generating process
of treatment variables (see the appendix for a formal representation). The
estimation method relies on the specication of a joint distribution for the
outcome and the endogenous treatment choice. Latent factors enter into the
outcome and treatments equations in the same way as observed covariates
and incorporate unobserved characteristics related both to the housing tenure
choice and to the probability of being unemployed. Since the latent factors
enter the likelihood function but are unknown, the maximization of the like-
lihood function is performed through simulation by drawing several random
numbers from a standard normal distribution16. The housing tenure choice
is modeled with a mixed multinomial logit, while the probability density of
the outcome variable is assumed to follow a logistic function.
The identication of the parameters of the model is achieved through ex-
clusion restrictions, that is we include in the tenure choice model a set of in-
15The method is implemented using the Stata routine mtreatreg provided by the ref-
erence.
16Provided that the number of draws is suciently large, maximization of the simulated
log likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood (Gourieroux et al. [1984]).
See Deb and Trivedi [2006a] and Deb and Trivedi [2006b] for a discussion on the choice
of the number of draws. In order to save on computing time, the program uses quasi-
random draws based on Halton sequences instead of standard methods based on pseudo-
random draws. The former have been proved to be more eective for maximum simulated
estimation as they can provide the same accuracy with fewer draws (see Bhat [2001] and
Train [2003]).
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struments which are excluded in the outcome equation17. Valid instruments
should satisfy two conditions: rst, they should be relevant, that is sub-
stantially correlated with the endogenous regressors; second, they should be
exogenous, that is uncorrelated with the outcome except through their eect
on the endogenous regressors. The literature which has attempted to identify
the causal link from housing tenure to labour market outcomes has plenty of
examples of instruments for housing tenure, such as regional homeownership
rates (Munch et al. [2006], Brunet and Lesueur [2009], Van Leuvensteijn and Koning
[2004]), father's occupation (Battu et al. [2008], Brunet and Lesueur [2009]),
age dummies (Flatau et al. [2003]), the ratio of the user owner cost to the
rent (Flatau et al. [2003]), the state marginal tax rate (Coulson and Fisher
[2009]), number of families within the household (Coulson and Fisher [2009]),
sex of rst two children born in the household (Coulson and Fisher [2009]),
housing tenure of parents (Munch et al. [2006]), housing tenure in the city of
birth (Munch et al. [2006]), price of rents in the neighborhood (Brunet and Lesueur
[2009]), vacancy rates (Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), average distance to jobs
(Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), age of entry into the housing (Brunet and Lesueur
[2009]).
Our data allow us to select a set of three instruments: the number of
family units within the household, the sex of the rst two children born in
the household and an aggregate house price index at regional level.
First, the number of family units should be related to housing tenure,
since single-family detached units are more likely to live in owner-occupied
dwellings while multifamily dwellings are more likely to live in rented ac-
commodation. Yet there is no reason to expect an inuence of the number
of family units on labour market outcomes, once controlling for the other
regressors.
Second, given parental preferences for a mixed sibling-sex composition,
the sex of the rst two children is used to create a valid instrument for housing
tenure as proposed by Angrist and Evans [1998] and used in Coulson and Fisher
[2009]. In particular, we create a dummy which takes one for households in
which the sex of the rst two children born is the same and zero otherwise.
Parents with same-sex siblings are more likely to have an additional child so
we expect the dummy to be signicant in a housing tenure choice model given
that the presence of children is well known to be correlated with a propensity
to become owner (see Coulson and Fisher [2009]). Yet, this dummy should
be redundant in an unemployment status binary model once housing tenure
17In principle the parameters of the model are identied even if the regressors included
in the outcome equation are identical to those in the treatment equations. However,
Deb and Trivedi [2006a] and Deb and Trivedi [2006b] recommend using traditional exclu-
sion restrictions for more robust identication.
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is controlled for.
Third, we use a quarterly house prices real index at regional level which
should predict the regional and time variation in the propensity to home-
ownership18. The choice to buy a home or to live in rented accommodation
depends of course on the price of houses. In fact the propensity to become
homeowner should drop as the house prices increase across regions and/or
over quarters. Yet, there is no a-priori reason to expect an eect of house
prices on individual labour outcomes other than that transmitted by housing
tenure (or by other covariates).
In principle we may use also regional housing tenure rates (as sometimes
is found in the literature) which of course should be strongly correlated with
individual housing tenure. Anyway there is no warranty that these rates
are even not related with individual labour market outcomes, since, after
all, the original formulation of the Oswald hypothesis argues for an aggre-
gate correlation between home ownership rates (most of all at country level)
and unemployment rates, whose micro foundation must be found out in the
individual causal link from housing tenure towards labour market outcomes.
3.2 Unemployment Duration
With regards to the unemployment duration analysis we model two hazard
equations, one for exits into employment and one for exits into inactivity,
where the duration variable is drawn from a specic question which groups
answers in trimester basis time units. We estimate these equations by a
discrete time proportional hazard model with piecewise constant baseline
hazard.
When duration data comes in discrete time as in this case, the typical
approach for estimation is to apply standard binary choice models to stacked
data, such as the complementary log-log (clog-log) or the logit regression.
We use the clog-log model which represents the discrete-time analogue of the
well-known Cox proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler [1978]).
The hazard is assumed to be constant over the duration intervals.
In order to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (\frailty")
the method we use incorporates a random variable which enters the hazard
specication as a multiplicative scale factor (see Jenkins [2008], lecture 7).
This random variable summarises the impact of omitted variables on the
hazard rate and is assumed to follow a normal distribution. However, a
crucial assumption in this model is that the random variable is distributed
18This is derived from the Halifax House Price Index (Halifax [2010]).
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independently of both the regressors and time19. As matter of fact, we are
estimating a random eects panel model with a clog-log link function.
4 Empirical results: The probability of being
non-employed
Table 7 reports results of four dierent models for the probability of non-
employment. The rst two use the traditional homeownership binary vari-
able, while the subsequent use the more precise 4-fold categorization. For
both cases we estimate at rst a standard binary model ignoring the potential
endogeneity of housing tenure, and then a simultaneous model which explic-
itly accounts for it. As set of controls we include disability/sickness benets
receipt, marriage status, age dummies, type of last occupation, education,
and seasonal, yearly and regional dummies.
When housing tenure takes the form of a simple binary homeownership
choice, we address endogeneity using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
model (see Wooldridge [2010] and Greene [2003]). A probit for unemployment
and a probit for homeownership are estimated jointly making use of a set of
instruments. Errors in the two equations are potentially correlated and are
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution. In column (1) and (2)
of Table 7 we report estimates from the standard probit and the bivariate
probit respectively. Endogeneity of homeownership is supported both by
the evidence of correlation in the two error terms of the bivariate probit
and by the Rivers-Vuong two stage test20. In both columns the negative
eect of owning the accommodation on the probability of non-employment
19In the literature the consequences of mistakenly ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
have been investigated mainly with reference to continuous time proportional hazard
model. The main results suggested in terms of parameters estimation are (Jenkins [2008],
lecture 6): (1) Overestimation of the degree of negative duration dependence, and under-
estimation of the degree of positive duration dependence; (2) The proportionate eect of a
given regressor on the hazard rate is no longer constant and independent of survival time;
(3) Underestimation (overestimation) of the positive (negative) eect of a regressor. How-
ever the magnitude of the biases should be attenuated when a fully exible specication
for the baseline hazard is assumed.
20The Rivers-Vuong test is carried out running in the rst stage a probit model of
homeownership in which are used as instruments famnum and hpinsareal (samesexhh is
not signicant thus it is not included in the nal specication). In the second stage a probit
regression for non-employment is run including as further regressor the predicted error term
from the rst stage (coecients are biased under endogeneity). Under the null hypothesis
of exogeneity the coecient of the error term is zero but the test suggests endogeneity of
homeownership since the hypothesis is statistically strongly rejected. Results of this test
are available upon request.
14
is evident21.
The binary denition of housing tenure is anyway too simplistic and re-
sults of models (1) and (2) may be misleading. Model (3) of Table 7 performs
a standard logit regression using the three housing tenure dummies as regres-
sors (the base category is private renter). Estimated coecients of the index
function suggest that after controlling for observable characteristics, mort-
gagers and outright owners are less likely to be non-employed than private
renters, while social renters are more likely.
However these results may be spurious since they ignore endogeneity due
to potential selection into residential status based on unobservables. En-
dogeneity of housing tenure dummies is tested using the Rivers-Vuong two
step method. The coecients of predicted errors from the rst stage hous-
ing tenure choice model turn out to be jointly statistically signicant, which
allow us to reject the hypothesis of exogeneity22.
Column (4) of Table 7 reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates
from the multinomial treatment eect model which accounts for endogene-
ity23. The Table reports coecients of the logit index function which are
informative on the direction of the eects but cannot be readily interpreted
in terms of their magnitude. Overall, there is evidence of selection on unob-
servables since -s coecients of the latent factors are jointly highly signi-
cant, which supports again a rejection of the hypothesis of exogeneity24. In
particular, both the coecients mort and out are positive suggesting that
individuals who are more likely to own the accommodation, either with a
mortgage or outright, relative to privately rented dwellings, are also more
likely to be non-employed on the basis of their unobserved characteristics.
Conversely, soc < 0 suggests that individuals who are more likely to occupy
the accommodation on social renting basis than private, are less likely to
21Homeownership is instrumented using only famnum and hpinsareal since samesexhh
is not signicant both in the bivariate probit and in the rst stage of the Rivers-Vuong test.
In the homeownership binary choice model both instruments are signicant and negative
suggesting that the probability of becoming homeowner is lower for multi-family detached
units and decreases with house prices. Results of the homeownership choice probit are
available upon request.
22In the rst stage we estimate a multinomial logit and then plug predicted errors in
the outcome equation. Results are available upon request.
23Latent factors are simulated drawing 1; 200 random variables from the standard normal
distribution. Standard errors are robust in the sense that take simulation error into account
(Deb and Trivedi [2006a], Deb and Trivedi [2006b]).
24A simple likelihood-ratio test for endogeneity corresponds to the test of the joint signif-
icance of the three coecients. The null hypothesis that the coecients are simultaneously
equal to zero is rejected which is strong evidence in favour of endogeneity (Deb and Trivedi
[2006a], Deb and Trivedi [2006b]).
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be non-employed on the basis of their unobserved characteristics. In other
words, when  is positive (negative), it means that unobserved characteristics
that increase the probability of being in that particular treatment relative
to the control, also lead to higher (lower) probability of non-employment for
treated individuals.
Estimates of the endogenous logit are reliable in terms of the direction
of the eects, both as regards the outcome equation and the tenure choice
model. In the outcome equation, the probability of being non-employed is
enhanced by sickness/disability benets, by living with spouse without job
and by previous occupations as Managers/Senior ocials, on Skilled Trades
or on Sales, while the probability is reduced by young age (16-34), by higher
education, by living with spouse with a job and by previous occupations as
Professional, Associate Prof/Technical, Administrator/Secretarial, on Per-
sonal Service and as Operative. In the housing tenure choice model (see
Table C1), instruments are generally signicant and consistent with our ex-
pectations: the number of family units within the household is lower in
private rented dwellings, siblings of same sex are less likely in private rented
dwellings and higher house prices reduce propensity to homeownership.
As regards the treatment eects of housing tenure, they maintain the
same sign as in the exogenous case, where mortgagers and outright owners
are less likely to be non-employed than private renters, and social renters are
more likely. To have an idea on the magnitude of the treatment eects, and
how they change after accounting for endogeneity, we report also estimates
of the marginal eects for both models. Marginal eects give the percentage
points increase in the probability of being unemployed for the change in
status between the base (i.e. private renter) and the current, given a specic
set of values of the regressors25. Table 8 report marginal eects calculated
at sample means of the regressors, while Tables 10 and 11 report marginal
eects at representative values of regressors (see the appendix for a formal
representation of marginal eects in the endogenous case).
Interestingly, Table 8 shows that while signs of treatment eects are main-
tained once endogeneity is accounted for (as we have already pointed out),
the magnitude gets smaller in absolute terms and the relative eect of owning
the accommodation outright is even no more signicant at 5%. In particu-
lar, the reduction eect on the non-employment probability for mortgagers
25A more syntectic measure of the eect maybe the average partial eect, which averages
over individuals the marginal eect of the variable for every individuals using observed
values. Anyway, for the treatment eect model in which simulated latent factors are
added to the outcome equations, average partial eect would require to recover the actual
simulated values, while with marginal eects we can get around it setting them at xed
values such as zero.
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shrinks from 6 to 2:1 points, and the incremental eect for social renters
shrinks from 3:8 to 1:2 points. How can we interpret these changes in im-
pact? One likely explanation is that in our specication we fail in modeling
some sort of skills-gaps which enhance the relative labour market position
of mortgagers and outright owners while weaken that of social renters. So,
when housing tenure is assumed exogenous, treatment eects are inated
as they capture also the eect of unobserved skills gaps. We believe that
this nding is quite relevant, since explanations of rescaling in eects after
accounting for endogeneity are quite unsatisfactory in the related literature.
In fact, previous studies which attempted to estimate the causal eect of
housing tenure on the probability to be unemployed, either did not focus on
multinomial tenure (Coulson and Fisher [2009]) or did not tackle rigorously
the endogeneity problem (Flatau et al. [2003]26).
Tables 10 and 11 report marginal eects when the set of regressors values
is chosen discretionally instead of at sample means. In these calculations,
we always hold x marriage status (non married), disability benets receipt
(no receipt), season (Winter) and year (2005), while Region varies across
Tables (South East or London), and age (16-34 or 45-54), education (GCE or
Degree) and occupation (Managers/Senior O. or Professional) vary within
Tables. The rule of selection is representativeness, in the sense that we
choose most frequent and relevant values (see Table 9). Again, we observe
in these cases that treatment eects for mortgagers and outright owners
shrink after accounting for endogeneity. Anyway, unlike marginal eects
computed at sample means, the treatment eect for outright owners remains
always signicant at 5%, and the treatment eect for social renters becomes
much larger. As regards the latter, it is interesting to note that the size
becomes very large, around 30 points, when age is set to 45  54, occupation
is set to Managers/Senior Ocials, and education is set to GCE, i.e. all
categories that are relative more strongly associated to non-employment.
Though these marginal eects partly disagree with those computed averaging
over the whole sample, such results cannot be ruled out either.
26However, Flatau et al. [2003] nd for males that the marginal eect gets larger for
mortgagers, remains similar for outright owners and becomes not signicant for social
renters. The marginal eect for social renters becomes not signicant even in the females
sample.
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5 Empirical results: unemployment duration
5.1 Exit to employment
Table 12 reports estimates of a discrete time proportional hazards model
using the sample of spells which either end into employment or are right
censored. Marginal eects measure the impacts of the covariates on the
probability to nd a job when the set of regressor is evaluated at sample
means. We report also hazard ratios for ready interpretation, which for
dichotomous variables represent the ratio of hazards between the selected and
the base category27. The rst column reports estimates of the clog-log model
without controlling for frialty. These estimates suggest that mortgagers and
outright owners have a probability to nd a job, respectively, two times larger
and 55% larger than private renters. There is not a signicant dierence in
probabilities between social and private renters.
The second column of Table 12 refers to the proportional hazard model
in which normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for. Esti-
mates are almost identical to those of the rst model. In fact the likelihood
ratio test suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is unimportant since
the  statistic is negligible and not signicantly dierent from zero28. Hence
we cannot refuse the null hypothesis that heterogeneity is absent. As a ro-
bustness check, we estimated dierent models with alternative specications.
Using a logistic model with Normal distributed errors, unobserved hetero-
geneity is not signicant as well, and using a proportional hazard model
with a Gamma distribution for frailty the likelihood does not converge29. In
conclusion, we have no signicant evidence of unobserved individual charac-
teristics which aect the probability of nding a job, thus we do not even
need to control for confoundness originating from unobservables.
As the baseline hazard dummies suggest, the hazard function exhibits a
non-monotonic behaviour (see model 1). In particular, unemployed have the
highest probability to nd job in the rst three months of job seeking. The
probability decreases steadily with duration up to four years, and increases
slightly afterwards. This gure is consistent with the commonly perceived
wisdom that as the unemployment spell lengthens, unemployed loose skills
27For continuous variables the hazard ratio gives the percentage increase (if the ratio is
greater than one; decrease if less than one) in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the
covariate.
28The reported  is the ratio of the heterogeneity variance to one plus the heterogeneity
variance.
29Results of the random eects logit are very similar and are available upon request.
The failure to achieve convergence with a gamma distributed frailty may be due to a very
small variance of the frailty.
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and attachment to the labour market, and/or employed are less willing to
hire unemployed due to a stigma eect.
The estimated eect of the other covariates is in line with standard eco-
nomic interpretations. People claiming unemployed or sickness/disability
benets have longer unemployment spells. Married unemployed are 25:7%
more likely to nd a job than non married. Least educated unemployed have
the lowest chance to escape unemployment. Workers who were previously
employed in elementary occupations have lower probabilities to reenter em-
ployment than the other types of workers, being the dierence signicant for
Managers and Senior Ocials, Administrative and Secretarial occupations,
Skilled Trades Occupations, and Process, Plant and Machine Operatives.
The probability to nd a job decreases with age, though the dierence be-
tween unemployed aged 16  24 and aged 25  34 is not signicant.
Fig. 9 and 10 plot hazard estimates for exits to employment by hous-
ing tenure. These estimates are out-of-sample predictions computed after
running the clog-log model (with no frailty), and refer to two representative
unemployed with identical characteristics, but one being an unemployed ben-
et claimant and the other not. In the second plot the hazards are shifted
downwards by a same amount given that claimants have lower exit proba-
bilities30. The decay in the hazard looks actually marked though after four
years it increases mildly.
5.2 Exit to inactivity
Table 13 reports the proportional hazard model estimates when spells can
end up into inactivity or are censored. In this case, outright owners have
the highest probability of leaving the unemployed state. In particular they
are 75; 5% more likely than private renters, who have the lowest probability.
Mortgagers and social renters behave basically the same way.
Even in this case, unobserved heterogeneity is not signicant suggesting
that ignoring it is not a major problem31.
Fig. 11 and 12 show the counterparts of Fig. 9 and 10 for exits into
inactivity. The hazard function of stopping looking for work has a similar
30The dierence in the level of the two plots is larger than the estimated marginal ef-
fect of the claimant dummy reported in Table 12. In fact, while the marginal eects are
computed at the means of the regressors, the plots refer to a representative unemployed
with characteristics chosen at our discretion: aged 25-49, non married, not getting dis-
ability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London,
in Summer, in 2005.
31No relevant changes take place if we use a random eects logit model. Converge was
not achieved using a proportional hazard model with a Gamma distributed frailty.
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U-shape form to that for exits into employment, in that it decays up to
the same interval, and it is higher afterwards. In the last interval the failure
probability is very high but this result must be interpreted with caution since
the interval dummy is not signicant. Anyway, the extent of the decay is less
marked if compared to exits into employment gures as the hazard ratios of
the interval dummies suggest. Moreover, if we look at the marginal eects
in Tables 12 and 13 and at the y-axis on the plots, we see that the changes
in the hazard are small in absolute terms since the probability of leaving
unemployment for a job is, on average, much higher than for inactivity.
As a matter of fact, unemployed people have the highest probability to
leave the labour force in the rst 3 months window, which suggests that
unemployed who decide to drop o the labour force do it mostly soon after
the start of the spell. Of course this result does not take into account that
unemployment periods can alternate with periods out of the labour force,
thus the evidence of most frequent jumps to inactivity in the rst time interval
can be consistent with soon leavers being more prone to reenter the status
at some point. Anyway, in general, it does seem that after four years of
unemployment the job seeker is at a crossroads: either nds a job, or drop
o the labour force.
As regards the eect of the covariates on the hazard rate Table 13 show
some interesting results. Unemployed benet claimants are 52% less likely
to stop being unemployed. This result is easily understood since job seeking
is a requirement for benet eligibility and the utility of the benet can oset
in most cases the disutility of the compliance to the benet system rules.
Instead, unemployed on sickness/disability benets are 58% more likely to
end up out of labour force. Married unemployment are more likely to drop
o the labour force. Elementary occupations are associated with the lowest
probability of leaving the labour force, which is signicantly lower than that
associated to Managers and Senior Ocials, Administrative and Secretarial
occupations, Personal Service, and Process, Plant and Machine Operatives.
Age and education dummies are not signicant.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we perform two tests of the Oswald hypothesis. First we es-
timate the eect of housing tenure on the probability to be non-employed.
Second we estimate the eect on the hazard out of unemployment, both for
exits to employment and exits to inactivity. The tests are employed assuming
exogeneity of housing tenure and then allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.
In the rst exercise, the null hypothesis of exogeneity of housing tenure is
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strongly rejected. Thus we estimate an endogenous multinomial treatment
eects model to account for the eects of unobserved heterogeneity which can
be correlated with housing tenure. Marginal eects estimates suggest that
mortgagers are less likely and social renters more likely to be non-employed
than private renters. Owning the accommodation outright reduces the prob-
ability to be non-employed relative to private renting, but the eect is only
close to be statistically signicant when marginal eects are computed at
sample means. The size of treatment eects is larger when housing tenure is
assumed exogenous, suggesting that we may have omitted in the specication
some unobserved skills which enhance the relative labour market position of
mortgagers and outright owners while weaken that of social renters. When
marginal eects are computed at representative values, the eect of outright
ownership turns out to be statistically signicant though quite small. Also,
for these particular cases, the incremental eect of social renting turns out
to be very large.
In the hazard analysis, unobserved heterogeneity seems unimportant and
estimated eects change negligibly once it is explicitly accounted for. Thus
we do not even attempt to control for confounding eects. Estimated eects
on the proportional hazard rate to employment suggest that mortgagers have
the highest probability to escape unemployment and that outright owners are
more likely to exit than both private an social renters. Exit rates of private
and social renters are not statistically dierent. As regards exit rates to
inactivity, outright owners have the highest probability, while private renters
have the lowest. Mortgagers and social renters behave the same way.
Flows from unemployment to inactivity concern in part workers with par-
ticularly low employment prospects who give up search, and in part workers
who decide to drop o the labour force independently. Unfortunately our
empirical strategy in estimating exits to employment cannot account for sit-
uations such the rst, which may contribute to keep job nding rates high
(low) for categories more (less) prone to end up into inactivity. For example,
since exit rates to inactivity are higher for outright owners and lower for
private renters, it may be the case that job nding rates for outright owners
and private renters are, respectively, overestimated and underestimated.
Overall, what is left from these exercises is that mortgagers have typically
the best labour market performance, while social renters the worst. As re-
gards private renters and outright owners, whether the former perform better
than the latter is a matter of debate. While we have no evidence in favour
of this claim, the evidence in favour of the opposite is only modest.
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Table 1
Sample statistics: Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
Labour Force status
Housing Tenure Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
owned outright 49,061 2,151 24,907 76,119
mortgage 245,333 4,818 14,342 264,493
rented social 29,070 7,442 23,497 60,009
rented private 35,502 3,234 5,095 43,831
Total 358,966 17,645 67,841 444,452
owned 294,394 6,969 39,249 340,612
rented 64,572 10,676 28,592 103,840
Total 358,966 17,645 67,841 444,452
Notes:
1. The sample is made of respondent male head of households in working age. Observations are
quarterly from Spring 1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005. A small
number of observations is dropped regarding people who have never had paid job, or get retirement
or old age pension, or are in full-time education or occupy the household rent-free.
Table 2
Sample statistics: Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
(percentages)
Labour Force status
Housing Tenure Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
owned outright 64.5 2.8 32.7 100
mortgage 92.8 1.8 5.4 100
rented social 48.4 12.4 39.2 100
rented private 81.0 7.4 11.6 100
owned 86.5 2.0 11.5 100
rented 62.2 10.3 27.5 100
Notes:
1. See note 1 to Table 1.
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Table 3
Sample statistics of inactive workers: Willingness to work by
Housing Tenure
Would like a paid job
Housing Tenure No Yes Total
owned outright 20,389 4,254 24,643
mortgage 9,055 4,773 13,828
rented social 13,156 9,793 22,949
rented private 2,685 2,139 4,824
Total 45,285 20,959 66,244
owned 29,444 9,027 38,471
rented 15,841 11,932 27,773
Total 45,285 20,959 66,244
Notes:
1. See note 1 to Table 1.
2. The sample is restricted to individuals out of the labour force. Results are derived from this specic
survey question: \Even though you were not looking for work in the 4 weeks ending Sunday the
[date], would you like to have a regular paid job at the moment, either a full or part-time job?".
Table 4
Sample statistics of inactive workers: Willingness to work by
Housing Tenure (percentages)
Would like a paid job
Housing Tenure No Yes Total
owned outright 82.7 17.3 100
mortgage 65.5 34.5 100
rented social 57.3 42.7 100
rented private 55.7 44.3 100
owned 76.5 23.5 100
renter 57.0 43.0 100
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 3.
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Table 5
Sample statistics of inactive unwilling to work: main reason why
does not want a regular full/part-time job by housing tenure
Housing Tenure
owned mort- rented rented
Main Reason outright gage social private Total
waiting application 0 2 7 1 10
student 44 77 90 87 298
look after fam/home 589 862 1,585 275 3,311
temp. sick/injured 110 165 422 129 826
long-term sick/disabled 6,060 4,349 9,851 1,687 21,947
doesn't need work 1,461 490 38 38 2,027
retired from paid work 11,808 2,766 822 273 15,669
other 451 455 363 213 1,482
Total 20,523 9,166 13,178 2,703 45,570
Notes:
1. See note 1 to Table 1.
2. The sample has been restricted to inactive people who declares not to want a regular paid job,
either full-time or part-time. Then results are derived from this specic survey question: \What
was the main reason that you did not want work (in the last 4 weeks)?".
Table 6
Sample statistics of inactive unwilling to work: main reason why
does not want a regular full/part-time job by housing tenure
(percentages)
Housing Tenure
owned mort- rented rented
Main Reason outright gage social private
waiting application 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
student 0.2 0.8 0.7 3.2
look after fam/home 2.9 9.4 12.0 10.2
temp. sick/injured 0.6 1.8 3.2 4.8
long-term sick/disabled 29.5 47.4 74.7 62.4
doesn't need work 7.1 5.4 0.3 1.4
retired from paid work 57.5 30.2 6.2 10.1
other 2.2 5.0 2.8 7.9
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 5.
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Table 8
Marginal Effects of Housing Tenure, at means
Logit - Exogenous Housing Tenure
dy=dx std. error P-value [ 95% Conf.Int. ]
outright owner -1.92** 0.0008 0.000 -2.07 -1.77
mortgager -6.03** 0.0013 0.000 -6.29 -5.77
social renter 3.76** 0.0016 0.000 3.44 4.07
Logit - Endogenous Housing Tenure
dy=dx std. error P-value [ 95% Conf.Int. ]
outright owner -0.06 0.0004 0.081 -0.13 0.01
mortgager -2.11** 0.0058 0.000 -3.23 -0.98
social renter 1.15* 0.0047 0.014 0.23 2.07
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. Reported marginal eects are multiplied by 100.
2. Statistics are from the models (3) and (4) of Table 7. Marginal eects are computed at sample
means of regressors and latent factors are set to zero.
Table 9
Sample means of regressors
variables means variables means
married - spouse in emp. 0.4467 2000 0.1699
married - spouse non emp. 0.1299 2001 0.1693
disability benets 0.0356 2002 0.1554
age 35-44 0.3275 2003 0.1157
age 45-54 0.2429 2004 0.1100
age 55-64 0.1458 2005 0.1051
Managers/Senior O. 0.2020 East Anglia 0.1009
Professional Occupations 0.1441 East Midlands 0.0728
Assoc. Professional and Tech. 0.1345 London 0.1095
Administrative and Secretarial 0.0523 North West 0.1011
Skilled Trades 0.1827 North 0.0418
Personal Service 0.0357 South East 0.1469
Sales and Customer Service 0.0325 South West 0.0888
Operatives 0.1298 Scotland 0.0902
Degree 0.2200 West Midlands 0.0880
Higher education 0.0986 Wales 0.0447
GCE 0.3021 Yorkshire & Humberside 0.0901
GCSE 0.1657 famnum 1.06
Summer 0.2503 samesexhh 0.1161
Autumn 0.2531 hpinsareal 1485.3
Winter 0.2414
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Table 10
Marginal Effects of Housing Tenure, Region of South East
Logit endogenous Logit
dy=dx std. error P-value dy=dx std. error P-value
age 16-34 - GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.51** 0.0015 0.000 -0.68** 0.0024 0.004
mortgager -4.1** 0.0019 0.000 -0.79** 0.0029 0.007
social renter 5.5** 0.0028 0.000 19.28** 0.0248 0.000
age 16-34 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -1.98** 0.0013 0.000 -0.38* 0.0015 0.011
mortgager -3.23** 0.0017 0.000 -0.44* 0.0018 0.017
social renter 4.44** 0.0025 0.000 11.77** 0.0200 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.28** 0.0014 0.000 -0.56** 0.0020 0.005
mortgager -3.73** 0.0018 0.000 -0.65** 0.0025 0.009
social renter 5.05** 0.0027 0.000 16.47** 0.0234 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -1.8** 0.0011 0.000 -0.31* 0.0013 0.014
mortgager -2.93** 0.0014 0.000 -0.36* 0.0016 0.020
social renter 4.06** 0.0023 0.000 9.9** 0.0178 0.000
age 45-54- GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.05** 0.0019 0.000 -1.38** 0.0040 0.001
mortgager -5.02** 0.0023 0.000 -1.6** 0.0049 0.001
social renter 6.58** 0.0032 0.000 32.26** 0.0312 0.000
age 45-54 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -2.43** 0.0016 0.000 -0.77** 0.0026 0.003
mortgager -3.97** 0.0021 0.000 -0.89** 0.0032 0.005
social renter 5.35** 0.0029 0.000 21.19** 0.0266 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.79** 0.0018 0.000 -1.14** 0.0035 0.001
mortgager -4.57** 0.0022 0.000 -1.32** 0.0043 0.002
social renter 6.06** 0.0032 0.000 28.31** 0.0302 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -2.21** 0.0014 0.000 -0.63** 0.0022 0.004
mortgager -3.61** 0.0018 0.000 -0.73** 0.0027 0.007
social renter 4.91** 0.0027 0.000 18.17** 0.0242 0.000
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. Reported marginal eects are multiplied by 100.
2. Statistics are from the models (3) and (4) of Table 7. Marginal eects are computed for eight
dierent sets of values for regressors chosen discretionally. Age, education and occupation can
take on two dierent values while the other covariates are held xed across sets of values. Fixed
values are: non married, no disability benets, Winter, 2005 and South East as Region.
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Table 11
Marginal Effects of Housing Tenure, Region of London
Logit endogenous Logit
dy=dx std. error P-value dy=dx std. error P-value
age 16-34 - GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.25** 0.0018 0.000 -0.85** 0.0028 0.003
mortgager -5.35** 0.0022 0.000 -0.98** 0.0035 0.005
social renter 6.95** 0.0033 0.000 22.78** 0.0265 0.000
age 16-34 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -2.59** 0.0016 0.000 -0.47** 0.0018 0.009
mortgager -4.24** 0.0020 0.000 -0.54* 0.0022 0.014
social renter 5.67** 0.0030 0.000 14.17** 0.0222 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.97** 0.0017 0.000 -0.7** 0.0024 0.004
mortgager -4.87** 0.0020 0.000 -0.81** 0.0030 0.007
social renter 6.41** 0.0032 0.000 19.59** 0.0251 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -2.36** 0.0013 0.000 -0.39* 0.0015 0.011
mortgager -3.86** 0.0016 0.000 -0.45* 0.0019 0.017
social renter 5.21** 0.0026 0.000 11.98** 0.0198 0.000
age 45-54- GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.93** 0.0024 0.000 -1.7** 0.0047 0.000
mortgager -6.5** 0.0028 0.000 -1.97** 0.0059 0.001
social renter 8.21** 0.0037 0.000 36.86** 0.0326 0.000
age 45-54 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -3.16** 0.0020 0.000 -0.95** 0.0031 0.002
mortgager -5.19** 0.0025 0.000 -1.1** 0.0038 0.004
social renter 6.77** 0.0034 0.000 24.91** 0.0286 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.6** 0.0022 0.000 -1.41** 0.0041 0.001
mortgager -5.94** 0.0026 0.000 -1.63** 0.0051 0.001
social renter 7.61** 0.0036 0.000 32.67** 0.0314 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -2.88** 0.0018 0.000 -0.79** 0.0027 0.003
mortgager -4.72** 0.0021 0.000 -0.91** 0.0033 0.005
social renter 6.24** 0.0031 0.000 21.52** 0.0259 0.000
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. Reported marginal eects are multiplied by 100.
2. Statistics are from the models (3) and (4) of Table 7. Marginal eects are computed for eight
dierent sets of values for regressors chosen discretionally. Age, education and occupation can
take on two dierent values while the other covariates are held xed across sets of values. Fixed
values are: non married, no disability benets, Winter, 2005 and London as Region.
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Table 12
Probability of exiting unemployment: spells ending in employment
or censored
(1) Hazard (2) Hazard
with frailty without frailty
dy=dx hazard ratio hazard ratio
outright owner 2.69** 1.552** 1.584**
mortgager 4.51** 2.045** 2.057**
social -0.31 0.942 0.964
claimant -1.89** 0.705** 0.712**
disability benf. -2.70** 0.506** 0.524**
married 1.22** 1.257** 1.247**
baseline hazard dummies
3  6 months -1.50** 0.726** 0.716**
6  12 months -3.77** 0.394** 0.394**
1  2 years -5.96** 0.199** 0.196**
2  3 years -5.87** 0.112** 0.113**
3  4 years -6.00** 0.052** 0.053**
4  5 years -5.23** 0.102** 0.103**
5  over years -4.45** 0.196** 0.200**
age dummies
25-34 -0.32 0.940 0.957
35-49 -1.42** 0.757** 0.783**
50-64 -3.61** 0.450** 0.471**
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. 1.33** 1.263** 1.258**
Professional 0.48 1.094 1.078
Assoc. Prof./Technical 0.77 1.151 1.110
Admin./Secretarial 1.66* 1.327** 1.327**
Skilled Trades 0.95* 1.190* 1.187*
Personal Services 0.46 1.089 1.083
Sales 0.32 1.063 1.122
Operatives 1.24** 1.249** 1.237**
education (highest)
Degree 1.49** 1.297** 1.310**
Higher 0.54 1.104 1.131
GCE 1.76** 1.366** 1.373**
GCSE 0.66* 1.130* 1.153*
seasonal dummies X X
yearly dummies X X
regional dummies X X
number of observations 31008 31,008
 0.00003
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. See the Appendix for the base categories of discrete regressors.
2. Column (1) reports estimates (marginal eects evaluated at means and hazard ratios) of the clog-log model.
Column (2) reports estimates (hazard ratios) of the random eects clog-log model. The dependent variable is a
dummy for the failure event: it takes 1 if the spell ends in employment and zero if right censored. Spells ending
in inactivity are dropped. Sampling weights are used in estimations only for model (1).
3. See note 1 to Table 1 for sample restrictions. Covariates are time-constant and refers to the last quarter of
the unemployment spell. Also people who have a dierent housing tenure either in previous or in the following
quarter are excluded. The  statistic is a test for the presence of frailty.
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Table 13
Probability of exiting unemployment: spells ending in inactivity or
censored
(1) Hazard (2) Hazard
with frailty without frailty
dy=dx hazard ratio hazard ratio
outright owner 1.98** 1.755** 1.776**
mortgager 0.96** 1.359** 1.365**
social 0.84** 1.335** 1.349**
claimant -2.01** 0.517** 0.518**
disability benf. 1.58** 1.579** 1.645**
married 0.61** 1.228** 1.221**
baseline hazard dummies
3  6 months -0.68** 0.769** 0.762**
6  12 months -1.36** 0.573** 0.552**
1  2 years -2.25** 0.375** 0.367**
2  3 years -2.28** 0.311** 0.310**
3  4 years -2.28** 0.281** 0.274**
4  5 years -1.98** 0.348** 0.329**
5  over years -0.40 0.860 0.854
age dummies
25-34 0.08 1.030 1.030
35-49 -0.13 0.956 0.959
50-64 0.06 1.023 1.026
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. 0.96* 1.349* 1.347*
Professional 0.51 1.180 1.159
Assoc. Prof./Technical 0.49 1.173 1.108
Admin./Secretarial 1.15* 1.413* 1.328
Skilled Trades 0.65 1.239 1.236*
Personal Services 1.42* 1.512* 1.460*
Sales 0.41 1.144 1.142
Operatives 0.72* 1.264* 1.243*
education (highest)
Degree -0.01 0.998 1.038
Higher -0.10 0.964 1.001
GCE 0.05 1.016 1.050
GCSE -0.05 0.982 1.002
seasonal dummies X X
yearly dummies X X
regional dummies X X
number of observations 29,041 29,041
 0.00001
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. See the Appendix for the base categories of discrete regressors.
2. Column (1) reports estimates (marginal eects evaluated at means and hazard ratios) of the clog-log model.
Column (2) reports estimates (hazard ratios) of the random eects clog-log model. The dependent variable is a
dummy for the failure event: it takes 1 if the spell ends in inactivity and zero if right censored. Spells ending in
employment are dropped. Sampling weights are used in estimations only for model (1).
3. See note 1 to Table 1 for sample restrictions. Covariates are time-constant and refers to the last quarter of
the unemployment spell. Also people who have a dierent housing tenure either in previous or in the following
quarter are excluded. The  statistic is a test for the presence of frailty.
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Figure 1
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
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Notes:
1. The sample is made of respondent male head of households in working age. Observations are
quarterly from Spring 1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005. A small
number of observations is dropped regarding people who have never had paid job, or get retirement
or old age pension, or are in full-time education or occupy the household rent-free.
Figure 2
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
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Notes:
1. See note 1 to Fig 1.
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Figure 3
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure - Employed, Unemployed,
Inactive want job
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Notes:
1. The sample is made of respondent male head of households in working age. Observations are
quarterly from Spring 1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005. A small
number of observations is dropped regarding people who have never had paid job, or get retirement
or old age pension, or are in full-time education or occupy the household rent-free.
Figure 4
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure - Employed, Unemployed,
Inactive want job
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Notes:
1. See note 1 to Fig 3.
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Figure 5
Cumulative Hazard to employment: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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Notes:
1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to employment.
Figure 6
Cumulative Hazard to employment: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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Notes:
1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to employment.
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Figure 7
Cumulative Hazard to inactivity: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to inactivity.
Figure 8
Cumulative Hazard to inactivity: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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Notes:
1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to inactivity.
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Figure 9
Hazard to employment. Out-of-sample prediction: non-claimants
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Notes:
1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (Table 12, column
1) attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative
head of household unemployed with these features: non claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not
getting disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London,
in Summer, in 2005.
Figure 10
Hazard to employment. Out-of-sample prediction: claimants
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Notes:
1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (Table 12, column 1)
attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative head
of household unemployed with these features: claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not getting
disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London, in
Summer, in 2005.
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Figure 11
Hazard to inactivity. Out-of-sample prediction: non-claimants
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Notes:
1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (Table 13, column
1) attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative
head of household unemployed with these features: non claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not
getting disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London,
in Summer, in 2005.
Figure 12
Hazard to inactivity. Out-of-sample prediction: claimants
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Notes:
1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (Table 13, column 1)
attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative head
of household unemployed with these features: claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not getting
disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London, in
Summer, in 2005.
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Appendix
A The Endogenous Multinomial Treatment
Eect Model
We give a formal representation of the model for the non-employment binary
outcome described in the methodological section and whose estimates are re-
ported in Table 7, column (4) (see Deb and Trivedi [2006a] and Deb and Trivedi
[2006b]).
Each individual i chooses a residential status j from a set of four choices
(j = 0; 1; 2; 3), where j = 0 is the control group (private renters). Let EV ij
denotes the utility associated with the j -th residential status and
EV ij = z
0
ij + jlij + ij; (A1)
where zi denotes a set of exogenous covariates with parameters j, ij are
i:i:d error terms, and lij are latent factors which incorporate unobserved
characteristics common to the individual i 's status choice and outcome. The
lij are assumed to be independent of ij. As a normalization EV

i0 = 0, so
the expected utility of j -th status is the dierential utility relative to private
renters.
Let dj be binary selection variables representing the observed tenure
choice and di = (di1; di2; di3). Also let li = (li1; li2; li3). Then the mixed
multinomial logit structure for the probability of tenure choice can be repre-
sented as
P (dijzi; li) = exp(z
0
ij + jlij)
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp(z
0
ik + klik)
: (A2)
Estimates of this model are reported in appendix in Table C1.
The expected binary outcome equation for individual i is formulated as
E(yi) = (x
0
i +
3X
j=1
jdij +
3X
j=1
jlij); (A3)
where xi is a set of exogenous variables and j denote the treatment eects
relative to private renters. The expected probability to be non-employed is a
function of the latent factors lij so that it is aected by unobserved character-
istics which aect the selection into housing tenure as well. The function  is
assumed to have a logit form: exp()=(1 + exp()). The interpretation of the
factor-loading parameters j is the following: when j is positive (negative),
unobserved factors which increase the probability of selecting j -th residential
status also increase (reduce) the probability of being non-employed.
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In order to estimate parameters of the model, latent factors are assumed
to be i:i:d draws from the standard normal distribution and simulation-based
method are used to maximize the log likelihood. Provided the number of
draws is suciently large (we select 1,200 draws), maximization of the simu-
lated log likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood. Parameters
of this model are identied when zi = xi, but Deb and Trivedi recommend
including some variables in zi which are not included in xi.
In the text we report estimates of the marginal eects for the housing
tenure dummies. Marginal eect of the s-th treatment relative to the base
category is the dierence in the probability of non-employment between in-
dividuals in the two statuses. Formally
E(yjds = 1) E(yjd = 0) = (x0+s+
3X
j=1
jlj) (x0+
3X
j=1
jlj): (A4)
Once , s and j-s are estimated, point estimates of this dierence can be
calculated replacing x and lj-s with appropriate values. In the Tables we
report point estimates when lj-s are zero (their expected value) and x = x,
where x contains either sample means or representative values of regressors.
So we compute
(x0^ + ^s)  (x0^); (A5)
which clearly has the same sign of ^s.
B Description of variables
Housing Tenure dummies
Housing tenure related questions refer to the household. Then the
outcome of the household is imputed to all individuals belonging to it
at the date of interview.
homeowner: selects all individuals whose household owns the ac-
commodation, either outright or with mortgage.
outright owner: accommodation outright owned.
mortgager: accommodation owned with mortgage.
social renter: accommodation rented from Local Authorities or Hous-
ing Associations.
private renter: accommodation rented from private.
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Unemployment duration
The variable is derived from the LFS durun variable which reports the
minimum of the length of time looking for work and the length of time
since the respondent's last job. The LFS variable groups durations in
8 time intervals: 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 1-2 years, 2-3
years, 3-4 years, 4-5 years, 5 years or more.
Claimant
This is a dummy for people claiming unemployment-related benets.
On the 7th October 1996 it was introduced the Job Seeker's Allowance
who replaced the old unemployment benet system. With JSA unem-
ployed can claim both cont-JSA, which replaced the old contribution-
based Unemployment Benet (UB), and inc-JSA, which replaced the
old retributive element, i.e. Income Support for unemployed. The
dummy selects all individuals claiming contributory JSA, or income
based JSA (or both), or national insurance credits.
Disability Benets
This is a dummy which selects people getting disability or sickness
benets.
Marriage Status
People are grouped in legally married (not separated) versus non mar-
ried. Among currently married we distinguish according to the spouse
being in employment or not. Sometimes in the analysis we do not make
this distinction since it does not seem to matter. The base category
are non married.
Age
The sample is made of male in working age (16-64). The base age range
in the regressions is always the youngest.
Last Occupation Type
Employed workers are grouped according to the current job occupa-
tional category, while non-employed workers according to the last job.
People who have never had paid job are dropped. Occupational cat-
egories are: (1) Managers and Senior Ocials; (2) Professional Occu-
pations; (3) Associate Professional and Technical; (4) Administrative
and Secretarial; (5) Skilled Trades Occupations; (6) Personal Service
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Occupations; (7) Sales and Customer Service Occupations; (8) Pro-
cess, Plant and Machine Operatives; (9) Elementary Occupations. The
default is Elementary Occupations.
Education
These are 5 levels of highest qualication attained: (1) Degree or Equiv-
alent; (2) Higher Education; (3) GCE A level or equivalent; (4) GCSE
grades A*-C or equivalent; (5) other or no qualication. The base
category is the last.
Seasonal dummies
These are quarterly dummies for seasons: Spring (March-May), Sum-
mer (June-August), Autumn (September-November), Winter (December-
February).
Yearly dummies
Yearly dummies for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.
Regional dummies
For the binary outcome models we use this classication: (1) East
Anglia; (2) East Midlands; (3) London (4) Northern Ireland (5) North
West; (6) North; (7) South East (8) South West; (9) Scotland; (10)
West Midlands; (11) Wales; (12) Yorkshire & Humberside. The base
category is Northern Ireland.
For the duration analysis we use a deeper classication: (1) Tyne &
Wear; (2) Rest of North East; (3) Greater Manchester; (4) Merseyside;
(5) Rest of North West; (6) South Yorkshire; (7) West Yorkshire (8)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside; (9) East Midlands; (10) West Mid-
lands Metropolitan County; (11) Rest of West Midlands; (12) East of
England; (13) Inner London; (14) Outer london; (15) South East; (16)
South West; (17) Wales; (18) Strathclyde; (19) Rest of Scotland (20)
Northern Ireland. The base category is Northern Ireland.
Famnum
This variable records the number of family units within a household.
According to the LFS denition a \family unit comprises either a sin-
gle person, or a married or cohabiting couple on their own, or with
their never-married children who have no children of their own, or lone
parents with such children".
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Samesexhh
This is a dummy which takes one for households in which the rst two
children born are same sex.
Hpinsareal
This is a quarter-varying region-varying aggregate index for (non sea-
sonally adjusted) real house prices derived from the Halifax House Price
Index (HPI). The Halifax HPI is the UK's longest running monthly
house price series covering the whole country from January 1983. The
Index is derived from mortgage data relative to transactions nanced
by the Halifax Bank itself, which represents the country's largest mort-
gage lender and provides a fairly representative sample of the entire UK
market (see Halifax [2010] for the methodology and access to data).
Regional indices for the 12 standard planning regions of the UK are
produced on a quarterly basis. The index groups Regions in this way:
(1) East Anglia; (2) East Midlands; (3) Greater London; (4) North Ire-
land; (5) North West; (6) North; (7) South East; (8) South West; (9)
Scotland; (10) West Midlands; (11) Wales; (12) Yorks & Humberside.
We select the non seasonally adjusted index covering all houses and
all buyers. The index is then deated using a quarterly Retail Price
Index and expressed in terms of purchasing power of the 4th quarter
of 201032. Since the index is produced on a calendar quarter basis and
we use seasonal quarters we match each individual (i.e. each Region)
with the appropriate quarter index observation using the information
on the date of interview provided by the LFS.
C Housing Tenure choice models
32We use as RPI the CBZW series provided by the Oce for National Statistics (ONS)
and available online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=21
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Table C1
Housing Tenure Choice Model. Mixed Multinomial Logit
OUTRIGHT MORTGAGER SOCIAL R.
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
famnum 0.541** 0.000 0.419** 0.000 0.34** 0.000
samesexhh 1.132** 0.000 1.672** 0.000 2.311** 0.000
hpinsareal 1.000* 0.016 1.000** 0.000 1.000 0.436
disability benf. 0.749** 0.000 0.482** 0.000 3.001** 0.000
marriage status
married, sps. in emp. 3.314** 0.000 5.532** 0.000 0.923** 0.000
married, sps. no emp. 2.621** 0.000 1.872** 0.000 1.437** 0.000
age dummies
age 35-44 4.577** 0.000 2.353** 0.000 1.848** 0.000
age 45-54 19.837** 0.000 3.056** 0.000 2.332** 0.000
age 55-64 94.392** 0.000 2.150** 0.000 2.507** 0.000
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. 1.834** 0.000 2.776** 0.000 0.202** 0.000
Professional 1.470** 0.000 2.265** 0.000 0.161** 0.000
Assoc. Prof./Tech. 1.257** 0.000 1.948** 0.000 0.214** 0.000
Admin./Secretarial 1.498** 0.000 1.837** 0.000 0.471** 0.000
Skilled Trades 1.917** 0.000 2.177** 0.000 0.681** 0.000
Personal Service 0.760** 0.000 1.027 0.483 0.578** 0.000
Sales 1.129* 0.018 1.282** 0.000 0.474** 0.000
Operatives 1.479** 0.000 2.106** 0.000 0.942* 0.048
education (highest)
Degree 2.330** 0.000 1.936** 0.000 0.294** 0.000
Higher educ. 2.149** 0.000 2.372** 0.000 0.500** 0.000
GCE 1.964** 0.000 2.221** 0.000 0.679** 0.000
GCSE 1.750** 0.000 2.078** 0.000 0.891** 0.000
seasonal dummies X
yearly dummies X
regional dummies X
number of observations 382,778
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%.
2. The Table reports relative risk ratios (RRR) from the mixed multinomial logit estimated jointly with the binary
non-employment equation. Results for the latter are reported in column (3) of Table 7. Notes to that Table
apply here.
3. Coecients must be read in relation to the base category, i:e: private rented dwelling. Given the variable
x and the residential status j (j 2 fOUT;MORT; SOC; PRIg), where P0(y = jjX) and P1(y = jjX) are the
probabilities of selecting the j-th status respectively when x is equal to a given value and x increments marginally
(or shifts from 0 to 1 for dummies), the RRR is dened as
P1(y=jjX)
P1(y=PRIjX) =
P0(y=jjX)
P0(y=PRIjX) . For the multinomial
logit it can be easily showed that the RRR does not depend on x. In fact when y is just dichotomous the
RRR collapses to the odds ratio. For example, for a one unit increase of a variable (or a shift from 0 to 1 for
dummies) in the rst column, the risk of being outright owner relative to private renter is RRR times more likely
if RRR > 1, or 1  RRR times less likely if RRR < 1.
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